Abstract: Despite decades of investment and institutional refi nement, externally funded irrigation programs still exhibit low success rates and more particularly in countries facing institutional and political challenges. This paper aims at bringing fresh insights on the reasons for such shortcomings with the particular case study of a donor-sponsored program recently implemented in the Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal.
Introduction
H ow to improve aid delivery in challenging contexts, and particularly in countries qualifi ed as 'fragile states', has been in recent years the focus of a burgeoning literature from the development sector (e.g., François and Sud 2006; Carvalho 2006; ODI 2011; DFID 2005) . Because development projects have often had mixed results in these countries, multilateral and bilateral funding agencies have been exploring potential avenues to increase the outcomes of their interventions under these challenging contexts. This is all the more relevant for agricultural water management (AWM) interventions which target complex social-ecological systems (Cifdaloz, Regmi et al 2010; Ostrom, Lam et al 2011) . Complexity means in this paper 'a situation where an increasing number of independent variables are interacting in interdependent and unpredictable ways' (Sanders and McCabe 2003, 8) .
AWM systems refer to all systems of water use in agriculture, from small to large scale, including irrigation, water harvesting and water conservation. Their complexity stems from several factors. First, water is a highly variable resource with a non-linear and therefore relatively unpredictable behaviour. Second, water systems are multiscalar and physically interconnected in ways which are still often poorly understood. Third, water is a common-pool resource which often requires collective rules to ensure fair access and sustainable management. Lastly, water is a spiritual, religious and social resource, management of which is subject to a myriad of local cultural norms and values. As a result, a huge diversity of customary water management systems have co-existed, governed by local and dynamic institutional arrangements to share, distribute water in a way that is socially acceptable by all water users in the community.
AWM systems are also complex because characterised by a high diversity of social constructs; i.e., perceptions and ways of representing the reality. For instance, different individuals or groups of individuals; e.g., men, women, landless and landlords, farmers and government offi cials, development practitioners and scientists, might have different perceptions on what would be the desirable objectives of AWM interventions. Research and development projects have largely focused on increasing irrigation effi ciency and agricultural productivity, whereas farmers might have other objectives; e.g., for women, meeting domestic uses with the canal irrigation system (Zwarteveen 1998) . As a result, many irrigation systems have failed to meet the needs of local water users, and particularly of the most disadvantaged groups (Vincent 1994; Mollinga and Bolding 2004; Turner 1994) , and progressively dropped out of donors' agenda (Lankford 2009 ).
When AWM interventions take place in 'challenging contexts' or 'fragile states', donors and implementing government agencies and NGOs have to cope with yet another layer of complexity in settings dominated by nonlinear institutional, social and political change. This paper explores some of the key mechanisms that create gaps between project intentions, practices and outcomes in the fi eld in complex context. It draws from the case study of AWM interventions recently implemented in the Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal through an externallyfunded project.
Following a brief presentation of the context and methodology, the paper presents key fi ndings on 1) which factors are perceived to be challenging, according to different groups of actors and notably funding in implementing agencies involved in AWM projects in Nepal; 2) how these challenges have created gaps between AWM projects' objectives and outcomes; and 3) why the current way of correcting AWM project shortcomings, that is creating 'new models', has repeatedly failed. Finally, the paper concludes with suggestions regarding possible avenues to move forward and overcome past project failures.
Methodology
This study was implemented within a larger research project, called 'Improving Sustainability 
Findings

Perception of challenges
Multilateral and bilateral funding agencies have commonly used the term 'fragile state' (and previously 'Low Income Country Under Stress') to name countries where the context is found challenging for providing assistance. The defi nition of 'fragile state' varies among donors but all refer to either: 1) a lack of capacity or will of the government to ensure development of its country; e.g., 'where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor' (DFID 2005:7); or 2) countries which are 'characterized by weak policies, institutions, and governance' (Carvalho 2006, p.3) .
For this study, informants were asked about the main challenges they had faced for their AWM/rural development program. Their answers were classifi ed into different categories, according to the nature of the challenge (Figure 2) .
Findings indicate that challenges are primarily perceived as political and institutional (Figure 2) . No 1) infrastructure development, 2) leasehold forestry and non-timber forest products, 3) crop and livestock production, 4) micro-fi nance and marketing, and 5) institutional support.
This study focused on the AWM interventions under the fi rst component but however also considered linkages with the other components of the program.
The characterisation of the local context and challenges was based on a preliminary fi eld visit led by the research team and two stages of 10-day and 20-day fi eldwork periods in fi ve case study sites led by an experienced Nepali consultant. Four sites were located in two VDCs of Bajhang District in the Far-Western region and one site in Mugu District in the Mid-Western region (Figure 1 ). Both districts meet many of the criteria of a challenging context: low accessibility with poor road network, health, education and communication infrastructures, weak governance, low food security and life expectancy.
Several AWM interventions had been implemented under the WUPAP project in these sites (Table 1) . Fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with villagers from different gender, age, caste and class groups. It was complemented by interviews with WUPAP project staff and local district government offi cials; e.g., the Local Development Offi cer and offi cials from the District Agricultural Development Offi ces, District Forest Offi ces and the Irrigation Development Sub-Division Offi ce (only in Bajhang District).
The characterisation of the national context and its challenges was done through a literature review and a series of interviews conducted with around 20 key informants, 80% of the facilities constructed in Phase II are appropriate and adequate'. However, the quality of the irrigation schemes was found to be variable because the latter 'have been designed by insuffi ciently experienced staff and without adequate technical supervision during construction' (IFAD 2011) . In addition, the mission indicates that: 'the focus of the infrastructure activities has been heavily biased towards construction with insuffi cient attention to appropriate community-led operation and maintenance (O&M) arrangements' (IFAD 2011) .
Results from our fi eldwork highlighted similar shortcomings. One out of the fi ve AWM interventions surveyed suffered from technical defects related to poor design (Table 2) . Two other ones were not completed because of increase in material marked difference in perception of the nature of challenge was evidenced among the groups of actors interviewed at the national level; e.g., bilateral donors, multilateral donors, NGOs and government offi cials. Several common issues were quoted across the groups such as the postconfl ict situation, a weak/fragile/instable government, the lack of local elected representatives and the politicisation of projects at the district and local levels. The government and politicians were perceived by donors to be the major actors 'responsible' for making the context challenging.
The perception of challenges was found to vary between the national and local levels. For instance, for the district government offi cials interviewed in Bajhang and Mugu Districts, it was the local politicians and communities' attitude that were making their tasks challenging. They also mentioned 'project dependency syndrome' as a major issue. Not surprisingly, the perception of challenges was found to clearly depend on actors' position.
Project outcomes in the field
In the second phase of WUPAP (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , 473 schemes were implemented (over the initial target of 400 schemes), benefi ting a reported total of over 29,600 households among which 7,450 households (40%) benefi ted from irrigation schemes. According to the latest joint review mission conducted by IFAD at the end of 2011, the 'design, construction and maintenance standards for costs and local confl icts over misuse of funds and water use rights. Furthermore, in all sites, the user groups formed by the project to operate and maintain the canal became dysfunctional after the rehabilitation works were completed (Basnet 2011) .
Linking challenges and project outcomes: Two Perspectives
The next step in the analysis was to explore the potential links between the challenges identifi ed by funding and implementing agencies and results from the fi eld. A guiding question was to assess whether the challenges identifi ed by respondents in Kathmandu had signifi cantly affected the outcomes of AWM interventions in the case of WUPAP and to untangle the mechanisms that linked challenges and outcomes.
The technical-managerial explanation
All the challenges described by the respondents were observed to signifi cantly contribute to the gaps between project objectives and outcomes in the case of WUPAP. For instance, the lack of elected representatives in the Village Development Committees (VDCs) and District Development Committees (DDCs) has worsened the politicisation of development projects, particularly in Mugu District. Most local NGOs are affi liated to one or the other political party, and each political party naturally champions its NGO for implementing WUPAP. In the absence of a district level elected body, representatives of political parties are battling for their interests in nonending negotiations. In Mugu, the selection process for the NGO to implement WUPAP in 2010-2011 came to a deadlock and the project was put on hold before fi nally being suspended in this district (fi eld visit, November 2010).
Another common challenge is the delay in taking decisions at the ministry level. That also proved to signifi cantly affect WUPAP implementation and outcomes. Particularly, delays in fund transfers from the Ministry of Finance to the MLD had far-reaching consequences in the fi eld -for example, purchased seeds did not reach farmers on time for the planting season (pers. comm., WUPAP country coordinator, March 2010).
The lack of technical capacity available in the fi eld has also led to defects in the rehabilitated irrigation systems as identifi ed by the latest joint review mission of WUPAP. In the village of Pothada in Bajhang District, the canal rehabilitation brought little improvement because the rehabilitated section was downstream a section damaged earlier by a landslide. In this respect, the natural environment was an additional challenge. Natural disasters, and notably landslides, seriously damaged two of the fi ve irrigation systems surveyed (before and after the intervention), thereby considerably reducing their performance. Another important feature of the biophysical and socio-economic context is the low accessibility of the sites, which adds further constraints on the project implementation, notably the diffi culty to recruit and keep qualifi ed staff within the project and district government agencies, transport construction materials and the increase of the daily burden of the social mobilizers in terms of time and effort spent to reach the sites.
Although the impacts of identifi ed challenges are real and substantial, this causal chain of explanation refl ects a particular view, which can be labelled as 'technical-managerial'. Most respondents from funding and implementing agencies perceived issues as challenging insofar as they were causing delays in project implementation, increased costs and, as a whole, hindered fi nancial and physical progress. The dominant solution advocated to fi x these problems has been to refi ne the 'project model' by creating 'better' institutions. Institution is understood here as formal or informal rules-in-use, for instance contractor guidelines, rules on the regularity and mode of fund transfer and on the form of community participation. The rationale is that the right model and institutional arrangements will lead to successful projects.
Institutions are indeed key components of projects as they shape actors' interactions and create or transform the set of incentives that infl uence their decisions. Another important but less acknowledged function of institutions is to modify power distribution among individuals and groups of actors. For instance, under some social settings, the rule to hold community meetings in a public space can deter women's participation because of prevailing gender norms.
The argument developed here is that, in a majority of AWM interventions, institutional design has been geared towards fulfi lling technical-managerial objectives (e.g., organising a community meeting) but has not been used as a means to address or challenge existing power distribution among project stakeholders (e.g., giving more decision-making power to the most disadvantaged). The next sub-section offers an alternative perspective on the causal factors that have created gaps between project intentions and outcomes. The argumentation fi rst draws insights from WUPAP case study sites before enlarging to dominant perceptions among donors, government agencies and NGOs interviewed in Kathmandu and to development studies in general.
The power-oriented explanation
First, re-consider the technical defects previously highlighted in WUPAP. A lack of technical capacity at the district and project levels was evident in terms of design and implementation and irregular check-ups during the construction phase (pers. comm., WUPAP project coordinator, January 2012). The commonly advocated solution in this technical-managerial view would be to increase the technical capacity and checks.
From a power-oriented perspective, a more critical issue is the lack of accountability of the project staff to people in communities. At the time the interventions were implemented, there was hardly any mechanism built in the program for communities to make the chairperson and secretary of the committee (acting as contractor), the local fi eld staff, the WUPAP project coordination unit, or IFAD staff accountable to them. Majhigaun gets regularly fl ooded because the intervention could not be completed due to an increase in material costs. Subsequent requests of the community to complete the irrigation system were not met because the maximum amount per intervention allowed by the project had been allocated to the village. The community has no means to infl uence IFAD to complete their irrigation system.
The main accountability mechanisms in place within WUPAP are the occasional evaluations commissioned by IFAD such as mid-term reviews, supervision missions, joint review missions and independent evaluations. Recently, the project started to conduct social audits. This is a positive move towards enhancing project accountability, as long as it is not a mere administrative exercise. After the latest joint review mission highlighted technical defects, a decision was also taken to check all structures and rehabilitate those defunct (IFAD 2011). However, the success of such an operation will depend on the good will of a team of engineers and it is unclear whether communities and individuals will have a voice to ensure that the process responds to their needs.
The lack of downward accountability is not specifi c to WUPAP. In most development projects, when the intervention fails to deliver products and services to a community, there is no mechanism for the later to sanction the project. In the development sector, there is a common disconnection between those to whom donors are ultimately accountable (tax-payers in the case of the bilateral donors) and the communities and individuals targeted by the project (Gibson, Andersson et al 2005; Oxfam 2011 ). The latter usually provide inkind contribution through labor and should therefore also be entitled to a stake in the outcomes. Yet most donors perceive in-kind contribution as a way to create community ownership of the structures rather than as a motive for increased downward accountability.
Landslides have been a real threat to the sustainability of structures. Yet a power-oriented perspective also highlights that only one source and form of knowledge has been considered: that of engineers. Farmers had warned the project staff of the recurrent landslides, but, as in many so-called 'participatory approaches', their participation was confi ned to labor contribution and there were limited avenues to integrate their knowledge in the design of the intervention (Basnet 2010 ).
Yet traditional irrigation systems have shown a high sustainability because the regularity and low cost of their maintenance has provided incentives to farmers to cooperate to repair them over long periods of time (Lam 1998) . In the case of externally-led interventions, farmers are either not able to repair cemented structures because of a lack of knowledge or high cost, or they prefer to wait for the next external project to fund the repair -the project dependency syndrome mentioned earlier.
Translating aid into a daily life situation, these two examples could be narrated as follows: you live in a house which your family has maintained for generations. One day, someone knocks at your door and asks if you would like a new roof, a modern and solid one. You accept the offer -free aid, why should you refuse it? The person sends a contractor who asks you to work under his directives. There is nobody to check the contractor' work and since you do not know much about modern roofs, you are not able to control the quality of the structure. A week after the roof is completed, it starts leaking under a small storm -something frequent in this region. You cannot fi x it because you do not know how to repair this modern roof. The contractor does not care. You call the person who fi rst came to your house. The later apologises, but they cannot send back the contractor to repair your roof, because they already provided aid to you and now they have to aid other people as well... This is not to say that aid is irrelevant. But dominant forms of aid have often followed the same patterns and been criticised for similar shortcomings: lack of downward accountability, lack of sustainability, neglect of local knowledge, etc. Development studies have explored why these shortcomings have sustained and this study has built on some of the major contributions from this body of knowledge (Cornwall and Eade 2010; Li 2007; Mosse 2005) to analyse AWM interventions in the specifi c context of Nepal. We discuss in the next section two major themes that have recurrently misguided development interventions: the use of simplistic narratives in development discourses and the particular set of incentives that drive institutional change in aid interventions.
Two Entry Points to Move Forward Discourses and practices
A discourse is understood as a 'a specifi c ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities' (Hajer 1995) . Discourses legitimise policies and institutions and shape beliefs and values. By establishing what is 'true' (Feindt and Oels 2005) , what is legitimate, legal and normal, they include/exclude certain groups of actors and views (Peluso 1992) . Discourses are therefore a way to both express and exercise power and can be envisioned as the articulation of knowledge and power (Escobar 1996) .
For instance, discourses on water productivity herald 'effi ciency' as the main goal and, as a result, related interventions have often disregarded issues of equityas notably exemplifi ed by the so-called 'modernization' of irrigation systems in Nepal (Ostrom, Lam et al 2011) . Because water productivity discourses depict water as a free fl owing resource which needs to be managed rationally and effi ciently, most water productivity initiatives have neglected notions of access and distribution of resources, and more broadly the political character of water management (Clement In Press) . Note that by 'political', I mean embedded in power relationships (see Mollinga 2008) , not 'political' in the sense of party politics.
In development discourses, terms such as 'participation', 'equity', 'inclusiveness' and 'empowerment' are interesting to explore because of their 'buzzword' attributes. A buzzword is typically a concept that is omnipresent in discourses and that carries ambiguous and multiple meanings which make it easily malleable to justify different types of interventions (Cornwall and Brock 2005) . To gather a large consensus, buzzwords have been largely dispossessed of their political content (Cornwall and Eade 2010) . For instance, 'participation' was initially envisioned as a process of social transformation whereby power inequalities among actors are reduced. For some international agencies it has become an effi cient and cost-effective way to reach the poorest (Mayo and Craig 1995) . The concept of participation has also often been used as an alibi for transferring responsibilities (without delegating decision-making power). As an NGO staff was commenting: 'in the name of participation, the poor do most of the work for free and are exploited' (Interview International NGO, Kathmandu, March 2011).
The WUPAP implementation was to follow a 'rights based approach', which can be considered as a further step towards empowerment compared to 'participation'. The rights based approach was to 'empower the participants by mobilizing their natural, physical and financial resources to harness external resources and obtain social justice' (MLD -WUPAP Project Coordination Unit 2007). This statement from WUPAP project document contains strong and political words such as 'empower' and 'obtain social justice'. However, as for many development projects Batliwala (2007) , the limited downward accountability of the local NGO contracted to implemented the project in Mugu District and their underpaid staff have few incentives to deliver on such objectives (Basnet 2011) .
When asked about how participation was operationalized, many of the funding and development agencies interviewed in Kathmandu described it in an apolitical manner. Participation was either described as the contribution of the community to the construction works; e.g., 'we ask for a major involvement of the community: 50% including 40% work and 10% cash' (interview international NGO, Kathmandu, March 2011), as a presence at project meetings, or as the choice to select the project activities to be implemented in their village.
Whereas these are all forms of participation, these types of interaction give a limited space to individuals and communities to express their needs and build their capacity to improve their livelihood. Participation in meetings is often elite-and male-dominated -even if all are present, not everybody speaks and, even if everybody speaks, not everybody's voice has the same weight. The inherent rationale and, at the same time, challenge for participatory approaches is to overcome existing power relationships within the community and between the community and outsiders (project staff, government offi cials, contractors, etc) (Emmett 2000) . If not addressed, the risk for any external intervention is to reproduce or even reinforce existing power inequalities and benefi t only those who already have networks, assets and knowledge (Mosse 2005) . The assumption that the marginalised will benefi t through the trickle-down effect has been challenged by a wealth of studies for several decades (Bardhan 1986; Arndt 1983; Gaiha 1995) .
A way to address this issue is to adopt a pro-active and affi rmative approach to challenge existing power distribution linked with gender, caste, class and ethnicity. Targeting the most disadvantaged groups, building their capacity and giving them a voice in decision-making processes could help to overcome some of the existing inequities. It obviously requires more human and time resources than a conventional 'participatory approach', as it might include for instance, visiting women or agricultural laborers individually at their home or overcoming resistance from the elite group (Mosse 2005) .
It is however a possible choice, which has been made by some of the NGOs and donors interviewed, as exemplifi ed in the following quotes: 'We have made a strong stand to pay equally men and women. It took time to implement, and it was hard, we had to repeat 100 times, but now women are proud to get the same salary as men' (interview bilateral donor, Kathmandu, March 2011) or 'We don't focus much on fi gures. (…) We look at more qualitative aspects. We have different tools. One is (…) like a community forum where women participate when they have time (…). They start talking about social issues, and they develop a plan to improve the situation. For instance, we provide basic literacy to help them marketing' (interview bilateral donor, Kathmandu, March 2011). The study could not collect evidence to assess whether these interventions have actually resulted in women's empowerment (e.g., were the women able to keep their salaries or did their husband claim it, what kind of plan did women develop), but such statements are at least indicative of a pro-active approach directed towards empowerment of the most disadvantaged.
Similarly, some of the respondents were asked how local people were empowered within their program. Most respondents referred to processes which actually delegate responsibilities but little power; e.g., 'We constitute water user associations and, at the end, the project is handed to them, after, they have to run the project' (interview government offi cial, Kathmandu, March 2011). Some described empowerment as a process depending on the community's own will: 'If people have interest, they will be empowered' (interview government offi cial, Kathmandu, March 2011). At best, empowering was described as letting the community decide on the project activity. These statements refl ect a discourse that envisions the community as 'recipients' and 'benefi ciaries' but not as playing a leading role in their development. Individuals participate but within a specifi c framework defi ned by the implementing/funding agency.
Project documents also confi rmed that dominant discourses on participation, empowerment and rights based approach are largely apolitical and ambiguous about how these concepts will be effectively operationalized in the fi eld. Such discourses leave suffi cient freedom for multiple actors to interpret and model those concepts according to their needs, interests, values and capacity.
Official and organizational objectives
This discursive ambiguity, which allows multiple interpretations of participation or empowerment, collides with a specifi c form of institutional set-up that characterizes many major development projects. In the aid sector, strong incentives steer projects away from the offi cial stated objectives (poverty reduction, food security, etc.) to achieve organisational objectives (spend money, show outcomes to the board, etc.) (Mosse 2005) .
As processes are focusing on achieving organisational objectives, key principles of the project, e.g., inclusion and social equity, become either secondary or assumed. For instance, monitoring tangible physical outcomes are preferred to monitoring social impacts which are more diffi cult to assess and it is assumed that the former will lead to the later. As a result, many projects suffer from under-skilled and understaffed human resources to ensure genuine community participation. Project staff also often lack incentives to follow the original ideals of empowerment, social justice, which clearly require different types of efforts than the achievement of organisational objectives.
In the case of WUPAP, incentives towards achieving organizational objectives were evidenced in a variety of ways. For instance, a social mobilizer was acknowledging that the farmers she visited to create the community organization were the most 'progressive' farmers; i.e., the village elite because they were usually more easily convinced to take part in these initiatives. Even if all households become members of the organization, the infl uence they have in decision-making is likely to be infl uenced by existing power distribution, unless an affi rmative approach is adopted by the project. However, social mobilizers are not evaluated in terms of ensuring that the poor do get a voice but in terms of the number of community organizations and user groups formed and number of meetings held. Again, the NGO staff have few incentives to devote more efforts than what they need to get a meagre salary.
In addition, WUPAP monitoring and evaluation system is geared towards physical and fi nancial progress and outcomes and there is no systematic evaluation on whether interventions have actually followed a rights based approach as per the project documents. This is the case for many development projects' evaluation systems. Those concentrate on results and outcomes, and more recently to some extent on impacts, but have largely neglected processes and the respect of the key principles they advocate.
Conclusion
This paper examined some of the diffi culties in implementing agricultural water management (AWM) interventions in challenging contexts, and particularly in Nepal. Based on the case study of WUPAP, a donor-funded project currently implemented in the Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal, the study explored the gap between project intentions and outcomes in the fi eld. Findings showed that the challenges resulting from the current political situation and institutional system in Nepal have substantially affected project outcomes.
To address such challenges, the predominant way to improve AWM programs and development models has been to design better models by refi ning institutions. Yet despite decades of aid in Nepal, most respondents interviewed in Kathmandu were critical of the performance and contribution of donors' interventions. The argument developed in this paper is that such shortcomings have sustained because institutions have been considered more as instruments to achieve technical-managerial objectives than as ways to alter power distribution among actors.
Technical-managerial problems such as lack of capacity, delay in decisions and fund transfers are all important issues and need institutional change to be addressed. But the analysis evidenced two other factors that contributed to create a gap between discourses and practice and which are rarely explicitly considered by funding agencies. One is the ambiguous and apolitical character of dominant discourses and the second is the type of incentives created by the organizational system. The analysis defends the need to reconcile the technical-managerial approach with a more power-oriented perspective. The latter argues for 1) transferring more power to local people, and especially disadvantaged groups to infl uence decisions on project design and implementation, and 2) offering them more opportunities to build their capacity and enhance by themselves their livelihoods.
Pathways to move forward could be fi rst to deconstruct the meanings of key concepts such as participation, empowerment or equity and make their political content more explicit to those who design and implement projects and evaluate their impacts. For instance, Cornwall and Brock (2005) propose to use chains of equivalence that link buzzwords with more radical terms such as justice or solidarity (2005) . Second, how these concepts are operationalized on the fi eld requires more attention. This should be clearly defi ned and once defi ned, allocated suffi cient resources and adequately monitored.
Some bilateral donors and NGOs have already made a step in this direction, for example by integrating local knowledge and customary informal institutions in project design, recognising the diversity of individuals' capabilities and needs within a community, or conducting social audits whereby local people are given a voice. In times when donors strive for increased budget effi ciency, it might be diffi cult to defend such approaches, especially in challenging contexts and fragile states. A fi rst step in such environments would be to set modest and realistic objectives to ensure quality of outcomes and impacts.
Another way forward is to rethink aid in a different way. Alternative forms of aid already include supporting existing government programs, whereby the donors play the role of adviser and expert to guide government staff on identifi ed weaknesses, but where the program ownerships remains with the government. Such an approach, however, is valid only in specifi c settings, where the government is committed to serving the poor and has relatively wellfunctioning institutions.
A more radical approach for aid, and probably most adapted to challenging environments, would be to give local people more power and control over the means through which they can improve their livelihoods, where the role of the funding agency would be limited to responding and supporting individual and collective initiatives. There is certainly no panacea and any intervention needs to be adapted to the national and local contexts, but to give an example, it could take the form of service centres where advice, loans, and subsidised inputs can be accessible to all on a long-term basis, with a special support for marginalised groups. Such an approach however does not fi t with a project mode and requires fundamental changes in the type of incentives that are currently generated by the dominant forms of aid organizational systems; e.g., increasing accountability mechanisms and privileging the quality of processes and impacts over the quantity of outcomes.
To conclude, we need to rethink development as a way to empower government and citizens rather than as a means to provide assistance.
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